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Introduction 
 
It has often been said that the decision of a slight majority of the British people to 
leave the EU after a referendum that was originally envisaged as advisory will bring 
fundamental changes to the UK. Indeed, but at the moment one can only speculate 
which ones, and with regard to IP law in the UK one may even speculate that the 
changes will actually not be that great and fundamental. Since lawyers’ speculations 
are always also normative speculations due to their subject-matter, legal 
commentaries ostensibly describing the law also shape it de lege ferenda, 
inadvertently or not. One has to ascertain the starting point for such speculations. The 
question is first whether the ‘Brexit’ will be a ‘soft Brexit’, that is, a departure from 
the EU while staying in the common market and the customs union, or a ‘hard 
Brexit’, where that is not the case, although some free trade agreement with the EU 
will be concluded. The ‘soft Brexit’ is a contradiction in terms and irreconcilable with 
the fundamental principles of the EU, as the EU itself has pointed out frequently,1 and 
in any case, this can now finally be ruled out after the decisive vote of the House of 
Commons in favour of an EU (Notification of Withdrawal) Bill without any 
amendments on 8 February 2017.2 A third possibility, still generally overlooked in 
public discourse, is the ‘crash Brexit’, where no significant agreement after Britain’s 
departure from the EU will be in place once the EU Treaties cease to apply to the UK 
at least two years (this period can be extended) after notification of withdrawal 
according to Art. 50 (3) of the Lisbon Treaty.  
I tend to think that the ‘crash Brexit’ is the most likely outcome, especially for 
IP law. A ‘hard Brexit’ will be more difficult to attain, because the extraordinary 
complexity of disentangling over forty years of UK membership of the EU will 
require an unpredictably long amount of time well over the initial two years. It will 
need enormously extensive expertise in one place and at one time which the current 
                                                        
1 J. Rankin, H. Stewart, ‘EU council president: it’s hard Brexit or no Brexit at all’, The Guardian, 14 
Oct. 2016; Report by President Donald Tusk to the European Parliament on the European Council 
meeting of 15 December 2016, European Council Press Release, 18 Jan. 2017. 
2 HC 8 Feb. 2017, Vol. 621, Col. 567 et seq. Div. no. 161. The changes required by the House of Lords 
may have some effect, but even the politically most prominent amendment, securing the rights of EU 
citizens after ‘Brexit’ (HL 1 March 2017, Vol. 779 col. 855, amendment 9B), may not be followed by 
the House of Commons.  
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British administration is unlikely to muster. It is not a very motivating job for 
politicians and civil servants involved either because, unlike the negotiation of a truly 
new trade deal, it has the air of destructiveness. Realistically, IP law as it is will be 
taken over into the post-‘Brexit’ era without much reflection about possible reform. It 
is hard to imagine that the present British government will excel in accomplished 
diplomacy as the conductor of a finely tuned compromise, a well-organised and 
competent process of give and take in an amicable environment for future trade 
negotiations with the EU. The present British ‘let’s have the cake and eat it’ attitude3 
does not further the British cause in negotiations with the EU opponents. These can 
increasingly afford to be difficult, not only to ensure that the British exit route proves 
unattractive to other EU States, but also because the long-term economic damage on 
both sides may have been done already anyway. And, for obvious reasons, Art. 50 is 
not designed to favour the leaving Member State. 
Overwhelming complexity and understandable ignorance in many issues when 
‘setting out the arrangements for [the State’s] withdrawal, taking account of the 
framework for its future relationship with the Union’, as Art. 50 (2) stipulates, will 
not leave much capacity and time to deal with IP law in any significant detail. So for 
IP law as a relatively minor area by comparison there is likely to be a ‘crash Brexit’ 
anyway, even if there is a successfully negotiated substantial agreement in other 
areas. The envisaged Great Repeal Bill indicates that, like largely everything else, 
current IP law in its mix of national and EU law, will stay in force as domestic law for 
the time being,4 and that will probably not change much whether the result is a ‘hard 
Brexit’ or a ‘crash Brexit’. 
In addition, there is for the first time the possibility of Scotland leaving the 
UK for economic and constitutional reasons5 – a factor which highlights how much 
EU membership of the UK has contributed to the stability of the national integrity of 
the UK. The recent Supreme Court decision ruled that the devolved governments have 
no veto on the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.6 This is constitutionally correct 
and unsurprising, but also politically unfortunate: it shows that when the Scotland Act 
1998 was introduced, Britain transformed itself effectively into a federal state 7 
without ever acknowledging that and without providing for that transformation 
properly in the UK political and constitutional system. It is imaginable that Scotland 
                                                        
3 S. Coates, ‘Have cake and eat it’ – aide reveals Brexit tactic’, The Times, 29 Nov. 2016. 
4 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, No. 7793, November 2016, ‘Legislating for Brexit: the 
Great Repeal Bill’, pp. 7-8. The Great Repeal Bill shall be included in the next Queen’s Speech (May 
2017). 
5  A. Sparrow and S. Carrell, ‘May’s hints at single market exit leave Scotland sidelined’, The 
Guardian, 9 Jan 2017. 
6 R (on the application of Miller and another) v Secretary of State for Exiting the European Union 
[2017] UKSC 5, para. 150. 
7 See particularly Scotland Act 1998, ss. 29, 30, 63A and schedule 5. 
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does not follow England and leave the EU (since the Scots have voted clearly against 
‘Brexit’ with 62%) and, given that there will be uncertain times ahead for the 
economy anyway, declares independence to re-join the EU later (with unclear 
success),8 probably, but not necessarily, after a second independence referendum. In 
such a case Scotland may carefully maintain the present status of IP laws and follow 
legislative developments in the EU before its readmission which may lead to legal 
discrepancies between Scotland and the rest-UK9 soon. The IP industries may find the 
Scottish version more attractive in some instances and plan their business 
accordingly.  
There is the final, no longer entirely remote, possibility that the EU will not 
survive for long, at least not in its present form. Particularly the outcome of the 
French presidential elections in 2017 is of central importance for the future of the 
EU.10 In addition, the EU will suffer economically substantially with the departure of 
the UK, and the balance of powers in the EU will change dramatically which may 
lead to an amendment of the EU-Treaties, or to a breakdown of the EU. If the EU 
were to disintegrate, this would obviously make the ‘Brexit’ negotiations redundant, 
certainly in the currently planned arrangement. From a British (or rest-UK and 
Scottish) perspective the effect on the reorganisation of IP law in the UK would be the 
same as in a ‘crash Brexit’. 
The following discussion assumes the continuation of the EU, and the 
departure of the UK from the EU in form of a ‘crash Brexit’ in relation to IP law, with 
the possibility of a subsequent or concurrent separation of Scotland from the rest of 
the UK, which would not change the rest-UK’s situation in the present context. Even 
in this assumed scenario IP law in the rest-UK will probably not change instantly as 
much as one may think. 
 
 
Legal Changes to Copyright Law 
 
                                                        
8 The idea of the SNP that Scotland, after having left the UK, could somehow continue to stay in the 
EU, is a whimsical idée fixe with no foundation in international law, see before the 2014 independence 
referendum A. Rahmatian, ‘The English Pound in an Independent Scotland’, (2012) 27(9) Journal of 
International Banking Law and Regulation, 336-339, discussing the international law aspect, and 
recently the EU, see L. Paterson, ‘Brexit: Independent Scotland would have to “join back of the queue” 
for EU membership’, The Independent, 10 Feb. 2017. 
9  The term ‘rest-UK’ denotes the UK without Scotland and avoids a discussion of the future of 
Northern Ireland in or outside the UK.  
10 Mehreen Khan, ‘Marine Le Pen’s poll lead hits Franco-German bond spread’, Financial Times, 20 
Feb 2017.  
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One may start with the least harmonised part of IP law at EU level, copyright law.11 
There are a number of EU Directives on special issues of copyright law,12 but there is 
no central Directive of substantive copyright or author’s right law. Harmonising 
model codes of European copyright prepared by academics have not advanced the 
matter further.13 A central substantive harmonisation would arguably not be desirable 
in view of the complexity of the concepts of copyright.14 The limited harmonisation 
however makes it easier to disentangle the UK from the EU. The specialist Directives 
(Rental and Lending Right Directive, Term Directive, etc.) will probably be retained 
within national law for the time being, either within the CDPA 1988, or as continuing 
statutory instruments or as new Acts of Parliament. Even where reform is needed, it 
will probably take several years until the British administration will have sufficient 
free space to consider changes, after urgent and necessary measures in the wake of the 
effects of ‘Brexit’ have been implemented. One example of desirable reform would be 
an amendment of the protection period based on the Term Directive and a reduction 
of the duration of copyright protection for sound recordings from 70 back to the 
original 50 years, in line with the recommendation of the Gowers Review in 2006, 
which did not see the need for extending the then 50 years’ protection period.15 
Following such an amendment, the shorter protection period would have to apply to 
new sound recordings only after a cut-off date, while the older works would remain 
subject to the old regime. 
Where the CJEU has pursued a harmonising strategy through case law, for 
example by developing the doctrine of ‘autonomous concept’ in EU copyright law,16 
or by establishing a quasi-harmonising definition of EU copyright originality17 (if this 
was indeed so18), it depends which position the English courts will take in the future 
(and whether the Scottish courts will follow suit). Since the main objective, 
                                                        
11 That means that copyright will be less affected by ‘Brexit’ than other IP rights. See also O. Tidman, 
‘Brexit: what next for intellectual property?’, (2016) Scots Law Times, 149-151. 
12 Especially Directive 96/9/EC – Database Directive, Directive 2001/29/EC – Information Society 
Directive, Directive 2001/84/EC – Resale Right Directive, Directive 2006/115/EC – Rental and 
Lending Right Directive, Directive 2006/116/EC – Term Directive (codified version), 2009/24/EC – 
Software Directive (codified version), Directive 2012/28/EU – Permitted Uses of Orphan Works.  
13 Model European Copyright Code drafted by the Wittem Group in 2010. 
14 A. Rahmatian, ‘European copyright inside or outside the European Union: pluralism of copyright 
laws and the “Herderian paradox”’, (2016) 47(8), International Review of Intellectual Property and 
Competition Law, 912-940, at 920-921, 937. 
15 Gowers Review of Intellectual Property (HM Treasury, 2006), 4.40, p. 56. 
16 E.g. in Padawan SL v. Sociedad General de Autores y Editores de España (SGAE) (C-467/08) 
[2010] ECR I-271, para. 33; EGEDA (C-470/14), 9 June 2016, paras. 38, 42. 
17 Especially Infopaq International v. Danske Dagblades Forening (Case C-5/08), [2009] ECDR 16, 
Painer v. Standard Verlags GmbH and others (C-145/10), [2012] ECDR 6; Football Dataco Ltd and 
others v. Yahoo! UK Ltd and others (Case C-604/10), [2012] ECDR 10. 
18 A. Rahmatian, ‘Originality in UK Copyright Law: The Old “Skill and Labour” Doctrine Under 
Pressure’, (2013) 44(4) International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law, 4-34, at 
18, 22, 25, 29-30, doubting this far-reaching effect of a harmonising definition. 
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harmonisation across EU Member State jurisdictions, has fallen away, UK (or rest-
UK) courts will have to be guided by the existing UK statutes and precedents and 
policy decisions within the UK, and here a divergence from the jurisprudence of the 
CJEU may emerge relatively quickly. 
Whether the proposed Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market19 
will be enacted and will have to be implemented before the UK leaves the EU is 
doubtful: any approximation to this Directive in the final form would probably be 
voluntary, and to the extent to which the provisions are acceptable to the UK. 
 
 
Legal Changes to Patent Law 
 
The EU unitary patent package,20 apparently an example of harmonising or unifying 
patents law at EU level, is really a patchwork comprising existing and newly created 
international law treaties which are not EU law: the substantive law on patentability is 
still the European Patent Convention (EPC) 1973 (revised 2000),21 and the EU patent 
court system is based on the Agreement on a Unified Patent court, an 
intergovernmental treaty between EU Member States outside EU law.22 The unitary 
patent system is a third form of patent regime alongside the existing national and EPC 
patents which is created by allowing the voluntary transformation of EPC patents into 
patents with unitary effect or uniform protection in the participating EU Member 
States.23 The unitary patent protection is however not autonomous but based on the 
Member States’ national laws24 and the EPC.25 The actual Regulation 1257/2012 is an 
EU-cloak which gives the non-EU instruments the effect of EU legislation. This 
quality as ‘empty shell legislation’ or ‘outsourced legal integration’ was also one 
argument of an unsuccessful legal challenge of the EU regulation 1257/2012 by Spain 
and Italy before the CJEU.26 
                                                        
19 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on copyright in the Digital 
Single Market – COM(2016) 593, published 14 September 2016. 
20 Regulation 1257/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation of unitary 
patent protection; Regulation 1260/2012 implementing enhanced cooperation in the area of the creation 
of unitary patent protection with regard to the applicable translation arrangements; Agreement on a 
Unified Patent Court (UPC Agreement) OJ C 175 (20/06/2013). 
21 See Regulation 1257/2012, Recitals 5 and 6, and Arts. 1 (2), 2 (b) and (c), 3 (1). 
22 UPC Agreement, Recital, paras. 3, 4 and 14.  
23 Regulation 1257/2012, Art. 3 (2), and J. Pila, ‘The European Patent: An old and vexing problem’, 
(2013) 62 ICLQ 917-940, at 936. 
24 Regulation 1257/2012, Arts. 5 (3) and 7 (1): unitary patent and nature of patent protection granted 
are defined by national law.  
25 K. Kaesling, ‘The European patent with unitary effect – a unitary patent protection for a unitary 
market?’, (2013) 2(1) UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 87-11, at 92, 110. 
26 Spain v European Parliament (C-146/13), Spain v Council of the European Union (C-147/13). See 
E. Pistoia, ‘Outsourcing EU law while differentiating European integration – the unitary patent’s 
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But it is this patchwork quality which may assist in constructing a unified 
patent system that may survive ‘Brexit’ if the UK (or the rest-UK) wishes that at all. 
For the EPC will continue to apply in the UK, and so could the intergovernmental 
treaty setting up the EU patent court system.27 But this court system may become less 
attractive to the UK, because the effect of the European unitary patent, providing 
equal uniform protection in all participating Member States28 and being an object of 
property under the respective national laws,29 will no longer be available because 
these rules presuppose EU membership. The substantive law of patentability and the 
grant and registration system continue to be covered by the EPC anyway. However, 
the main concern of the ‘Brexit’-focused British government, that the UK should be 
outside the jurisdiction of the CJEU,30 appears to be of limited importance here. The 
European patent court system comprises a Court of First Instance and a Court of 
Appeal,31 but not the CJEU as a final appeal court in patent matters; this was also a 
reason why the Regulation 1257/2012 avoided substantive law provisions as EU 
patent law which would have attracted CJEU jurisdiction. 32  The CJEU is only 
included through the preliminary referral mechanism.33 To what extent the CJEU will 
accept being confined to this role only in patent matters remains to be seen, given that 
the basis of the unitary patent is an EU regulation.34  
Even if the UK wants to abandon the powers of the CJEU completely, then at 
least any interpretation of Art. 50 of the Lisbon Treaty and dealings under this rule 
invariably remain within the CJEU’s jurisdiction. Furthermore, the recent affirmation 
of the UK government to ratify the respective EU unitary patent regulations35 shortly 
before the planned exit of Britain from the EU can only make sense if UK legislation 
requires the UK Supreme Court to consider the CJEU’s decisions as binding or 
persuasive authority in relation to European patent law. After all, the planned Great 
                                                                                                                                                              
identity in the two “Spanish rulings” of 5 May 2015’, (2016), 41(5) European Law Review, 711-726, at 
713, 716-718. 
27 Only EU states can accede to the UPC Agreement, see para. 14 of the Recital and Art. 84, but if the 
UK accedes as EU Member and negotiates a continuing membership to the UPC Agreement after 
departure from the EU, the UPC Agreement could survive. See H. Dunlop, ‘What now for the Unified 
Patents Court following the Brexit referendum?’, (2016) 38(10) EIPR, 595-597, at 597.  
28 Regulation 1257/2012, Art. 3 (2). 
29 Regulation 1257/2012, Art. 7 (1). 
30 White Paper, The United Kingdom’s exit from and new partnership with the European Union, Cm 
9417, Feb. 2017, para. 2.3, p. 13. 
31 UPC Agreement, Art. 6. 
32 K. Kaesling, ‘The European patent with unitary effect – a unitary patent protection for a unitary 
market?’, (2013) 2(1) UCL Journal of Law and Jurisprudence, 98. 
33 UPC Agreement, Art. 21. 
34 J. Pila, ‘An Historical Perspective I: The Unitary Patent Package’, in: J. Pila and Ch. Wadlow (eds.), 
The Unitary EU Patent System (London: Hart Publishing, 2014), 9-31, at 30-31. 
35 On 14 December 2016, the UK’s deputy permanent representative to the EU signed the Protocol on 
Privileges and Immunities of the Unified Patent Court, see Council of the EU website:  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/documents-publications/agreements-
conventions/agreement/?aid=2016047 (visited 20 Feb. 2017). 
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Repeal Bill is supposed to transpose the EU Regulations into UK law, if these are 
ratified by the date when the UK finally leaves the EU.36 In addition, a framework of 
meetings between judges and patent examiners across Europe to adjust and align 
decisions and practices will have to be established. 
The inevitable rapprochement between the UK and the US as a result of the 
UK about to leave the EU common market37 may also have implications for the UK 
patent regime. It is possible that the UK will see the need to enter into a bilateral IP 
agreement with the US, a form of TRIPS-plus agreement, which is likely to benefit 
the US more than the UK, because true reciprocity is difficult to achieve in view of 
the unequal economic and political powers of the parties. Actual equality was not 
realised with TRIPS itself, irrespective of the initial good intentions: 38  TRIPS 
operated in favour of the Western world.39 As a result of such a new bilateral IP 
regime, the UK may have to give up the non-patentability of business methods and 
computer programs according to the EPC40 and therefore may have to withdraw from 
the EPC if the IP provisions of the new bilateral agreement are incompatible with 
mandatory EPC rules. 
 
 
Legal Changes to Trade Marks Law 
 
The underlying international framework remains in place and continues to set the 
scene, especially the TRIPS Agreement, 41  the Madrid Protocol 42  and the Paris 
Convention, 43  and it is most likely that the Trade Marks Directive harmonising 
national trade mark law44  will remain incorporated in domestic UK law, as it is 
already in form of the Trade Marks Act 1994 which implemented the Directive. 
Where the newest (recast) version of the Directive departs from the older versions as 
enacted in the Trade Marks Act (particularly in relation to the abolition of the 
                                                        
36 House of Commons Library Briefing Paper, No. 7793, November 2016, ‘Legislating for Brexit: the 
Great Repeal Bill’, pp. 22-23. 
37 The British Prime Minister’s state visit to the new (controversial) US president immediately after his 
inauguration in late January 2017 is an indicator for this likely development.   
38 TRIPS Agreement 1994, Art. 7 and Preamble, para. 6.  
39  E.g. F. M. Abbott, ‘Protecting First World Assets in the Third World: Intellectual Property 
Negotiations in the GATT Multilateral Framework’, (1989) 22(4) Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational 
Law, 689–745; P. Drahos, ‘Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property Standard-
Setting’, (2002) 5(5) The Journal of World Intellectual Property, 765–89. 
40 EPC 1973, Art. 52 (2) (c). Compare the US: Patent Act 1952, §§ 101 and 102. 
41 TRIPS Agreement 1994, Arts. 15-21. 
42 Protocol Relating to the Madrid Agreement concerning the International Registration of Marks 1989. 
The UK is not a member of the Madrid Agreement 1891 itself. 
43 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property 1883 (1979), Arts. 6-10. 
44 Directive (EU) 2015/2436 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2015 to 
approximate the laws of the Members States relating to trade marks (recast). Before: Directive 
2008/95/EC. 
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graphical representation requirement and the restriction of the own name defence45) it 
is probable that the Trade Marks Act will be amended accordingly,46 though, if that 
happens after ‘Brexit’, not by statutory instrument as it is at the moment, but by Act 
of Parliament,47 which may be constitutionally more satisfactory anyway.  
In relation to the European Union Trade Mark (until 23 March 2016: 
Community Trade Mark), it follows from Art. 1 (2) of the EUTM Regulation that EU 
Trade Marks can only have effect in an EU Member State. Thus it may be advisable 
to introduce a regime whereby the existing EU Trade Marks should benefit from a 
conversion regime similar to that in the Madrid Protocol48 that prevents the effect of a 
successful central attack of an international trade mark under the Madrid 
Agreement.49 (The EUTMR in Arts. 34 and 35 would be no sufficient basis for that; a 
special settlement would be required.) That means that with the departure of the UK 
from the EU, existing EU trade marks would be converted into national trade marks in 
the UK with the original priority date. The trade mark registers would have to be 
amended accordingly over time, but this change should only be declarative, otherwise 
there would be too much delay because of a too great administrative burden on the 
trade mark offices at too short notice.50 British applicants for EU Trade Marks after 
‘Brexit’ would presumably have to appoint a representative for any proceedings 
before the EUIPO except for the filing.51 Otherwise, future international or European 
trade marks from UK applicants would have to be subject to the Madrid regime.  
Assuming that the EU continues to exist, then the CJEU will keep handing 
down decisions based on the Trade Marks Directive and Regulation. Since the legal 
provisions remain the same in the UK and the EU for some time, the CJEU’s 
decisions could remain persuasive authority for a while, unless political opinion 
dictates a petulant contrarian attitude for its own sake. Obviously this does not rule 
out departure from the case law of the CJEU where this is felt necessary, and that may 
frequently be the case. 
 
 
                                                        
45 Directive 2015/2436, Arts. 3, 4, 14 (1)(a).  
46 Member States have to implement the Directive (at least the great majority of its changes) by 14 
January 2019, see Directive 2015/2436, Art. 54 – that is, before the earliest possible date of the UK 
leaving the EU. 
47 Ch. Morcom, ‘The implications of “Brexit” for trade marks and for practitioners in the UK: what are 
the likely effects and what needs to happen now?’ (2016) 38(11) EIPR 657-660, at 660. 
48 Madrid Protocol 1989, Arts. 4, 6 (4), and Art. 9quinquies. 
49 Madrid Agreement 1891, Art. 6 (3). 
50 For this problem, see also Ch. Morcom, ‘The implications of “Brexit” for trade marks and for 
practitioners in the UK: what are the likely effects and what needs to happen now?’ (2016) 38(11) 
EIPR 657-660, at 658. 
51 This would certainly be so under the present rules if the UK also leaves the EEA which seems to be 
planned, see the EUIPO website: 
https://euipo.europa.eu/ohimportal/en/ownership (visited 20 February 2017). 
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The Economic and Social Reality of ‘Brexit’ for IP 
 
While by and large the changes of English IP law will be limited even after a ‘crash 
Brexit’, the political and social implications of the departure from the EU will be 
fundamental and will directly affect the IP market and the creative sector. The present 
British government has interpreted quickly the result of the ‘Brexit’ referendum as a 
decision against immigration and against foreigners (especially EU citizens) in 
general,52 and the behaviour of the government so far suggests that resident EU-
citizens are only considered as bargaining chips,53 but otherwise not really welcome. 
A mysterious feature of this new UK policy is a drive for free trade agreements 
worldwide (though not with the biggest trading partner, the EU), while at the same 
time a willingness to impose severe restrictions on immigration and even to induce 
people to leave Britain who have been in the country for many years.54  That is 
particularly contradictory for the service industries which consist of people, their 
creativity and their know-how, the essence of IP protection. This is the spectre of a 
free market without human beings. A constraint of free movement and exchange of 
people, their services and their know-how can significantly damage the real market. A 
seller needs a buyer, a creditor a debtor, a service provider a customer, and, in a 
globalised world, these are very often foreigners. And why would anyone want to 
trade with you if you intimate clearly that you have a dislike for foreign people 
working with and for you and applying their expertise? 
This conflicting approach – consume British products and services and 
produce them in Britain by British employees, but export them freely to the world – 
may have unexpected consequences. Europeans and other non-British people who 
decide to leave Britain under its new order or may even be made to leave under 
draconian immigration rules are unlikely to be great ambassadors in favour of the 
consumption of British products and services.55 British trade marks – duly denoting 
the origin and quality of the product or service as British – could then prove 
detrimental. There could even be an informal boycott of British products on the 
European Continent, a hypocritical move because the current nationalistic sentiment 
on the Continent is comparable to that in Britain and by no means morally superior. In 
                                                        
52 See e.g. Prime Minister Theresa May’s keynote speech at Tory Conference, The Independent (full 
transcript), 5 Oct 2016: ‘But let’s state one thing loud and clear: we are not leaving the European 
Union only to give up control of immigration all over again. And we are not leaving only to return to 
the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. That’s not going to happen.’ 
53 L. O’Carrol, ‘Assuring EU Citizens of right to stay “would lose UK negotiating capital”’, The 
Guardian, 9 Jan 2017. 
54  See e.g. D. Boffey and L. O’Carroll, ‘Plight of EU nationals seeking UK residency to be 
investigated’, The Guardian, 25 Jan. 2017. 
55  See also D. Boffey, ‘Britons living in the EU face Brexit backlash, leaked paper warns’, The 
Guardian, 13 Feb. 2017. 
 10 
any case, a boycott would not be a too heroic undertaking, because most exported 
British products can be substituted fairly easily by products from Europe or 
elsewhere: for example, British food production will never pose a challenge to the 
French and Italian food industries or indeed any other. 
Copyright will also be affected: in the arts and culture nationalism and a 
movement towards inward-looking isolationism drives creativity away. Such a 
culturally insular attitude is obviously not a new British phenomenon. As the 
constructive artist Naum Gabo (1890-1977) said about his stay in Britain during the 
second world war (he lived in Russia, Germany and France before):56  
 
‘[A]nybody who was not born English … will always be and remain a stranger 
in this country and he will always be made to feel it. I … understand why all 
those foreign intellectuals who came first to this country left it so hurriedly 
one by one. … [T]he atmosphere is saturated with such a static tradition … 
that it simply does not permit any penetration by a foreign body…’  
 
But even if one assumes that Britain may not have absorbed too much foreign artistic, 
intellectual and scientific influences, it has always provided a friendly substrate on 
which such developments could flourish. With this friendly substrate – a sound and 
stable democracy and constitutional order and openness to people coming from 
elsewhere – now fast disappearing, artists and other representatives of the creative 
industries, as well as scientists, may depart to Paris (still the unopposed capital city of 
the arts), Rome or Berlin and may take many British creative people with them who 
also need this intellectually enriching atmosphere.57 Britain may then have a fine 
copyright law, but what it protects may be culturally less interesting.  
The same situation is in relation to technological innovation and patent law. 
The sources of innovation, science and technology are mostly still the universities, 
and the transmission of knowledge and experiment may translate into start-up and 
spin-off companies: how an exchange of scientific and technological knowledge in a 
globalised world can happen despite a severe limitation of free movement of people is 
beyond comprehension. British enterprises which are limited in recruiting skilled 
employees in the IT and technology sector from Eastern Europe or Asia will seriously 
have to think about relocating their businesses to countries with fewer restrictions. 
Thus Britain may have a fine patent law, but what it protects may not be very 
innovative on a world scale. 
                                                        
56 M. Hammer and Ch. Lodder, Constructing Modernity: The Art and Career of Naum Gabo (New 
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2000), 277. 
57  Perhaps an early example: S. Pritchard, ‘Top orchestra quits Britain over Brexit migration 
clampdown’, The Guardian, 18 Feb. 2017. 
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While IP law will probably be able to adapt to ‘Brexit’ without 
insurmountable difficulties, in the reality of business the IP industries may well face 
fundamental problems. The IP economy could shrink significantly (except probably 
the defence and combat of cybercrime sectors), which may relegate IP law again to a 
rather esoteric specialisation within commercial law, as in the 1960s.  
 
______________________ 
